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ABSTRACT
23 March 2021, a year since the first “work from home” government instruction so as to rein the spread of the severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic in the United Kingdom. On 25 March 2020, the
Coronavirus Act 2020 gained Royal Assent, came into law and it is a parliamentary consensus that the Act has
beneficially enhanced the ability of public bodies to implement measures to save lives. In a commitment to
continuously review the COVID-19 secure guidance that operationalizes the Act, the One Year Report on the Status
on the Non-devolved Provisions of the Coronavirus Act 2020 was presented to Parliament in March 2021. In parallel
response to the Government’s review of measures implemented to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, organizational
theorists have investigated the management of compliance with these containment efforts. Bounded rationality, the
classical rational choice critique, as espoused by Herbert A. Simon, is a spurious penchant given its inadvertence of
structural formulation. Primarily informed by a critical realist approach to the politics of organizational decision-
making this article identifies limitations in rational choice theory, coupled with gender blind technological
determinism, as insufficiently recognised determinants of compliance with COVID-19 secure workplace guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
The evolution and contagious transmission of a novel
coronavirus disease (COVID-19) reported initially in December
2019 in the Wuhan, Hubei province China rapidly escalated
into a catastrophic global public health crisis. Globally, as of
23rd April 2021, 3,066,113 COVID-19 deaths have been
reported to the World Health Organization, including 127,345
recorded deaths in the United Kingdom [1]. The Coronavirus
pandemic has increased exponentially the exposure of healthcare
systems to becoming overwhelmed. Consequently, governments
throughout the world have instituted into statute restrictions at
the level of economy, employment and society in order to protect
national healthcare and abate an emergency crisis of provision.
The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act 2020, instigated as a
legislative response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and has
necessitated a profound impact on business operations,
organizational inter-personal dynamics and decision-making. On
25th March, the Coronavirus Act 2020 achieved Royal Assent
and is defined in law as: “An Act to make provision in
connection with coronavirus; and for connected purposes” [2].
The World Health Organization (WHO) on 11th March 2020
had declared, the unprecedented spread of the acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a global pandemic of the
coronavirus disease, COVID-19. In September 2020 the
Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, by command of
her Majesty, presented to Parliament: The Coronavirus Act
Analysis. Comprehensive and concise the document provides a
political background for the government’s “coronavirus action
plan” and context for the institution of the Coronavirus Act
2020 upon which is conferred the legal power to issue temporary
closure decisions. For, it is documented that the Government’s
“4-Stage Strategy: contain, delay, research, mitigate” deemed it
necessary to formulate legislation “in order to give public bodies
across the UK the tools and powers they need to carry out an
effective response” to the pandemic.
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On the 23rd March 2020 the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom announced the first of a series of national lockdowns:
“The coronavirus is the biggest threat this country has faced for
decades and therefore I urge you at this moment of national
emergency to stay at home protect our NHS and save lives” [3].
The organizational implications of the Coronavirus Act 2020,
legislative ascription to government, power to issue COVID-19
secure workplace closure directions are unprecedented in
peacetime. Covered by the auspices of “temporary closure of
educational institutions” the Coronavirus Act 2020, “makes
provision enabling the Secretary of State and the Welsh
ministers to give directions for the restriction of attendance of
premises used for the provision of education or childcare”;
additionally, under aegis of “power to issue directions relating to
events, gatherings and premises” the Act confers power to issue
closure directions to businesses and organizations etc., [2]. The
immediate consequence of exercising these powers has been a
remarkable disjuncture in organizational decision-making; and
these innovations are rapidly habituated given the built-in
longevity of the Act’s ascription. For, it has been stipulated that
the Act’s ascription to government, the power to temporarily
close educational institutions: “needs to be retained (for at least
the full 2 year period specified in the Act) to support the
Secretary of State for Education (SoSfE)’s ability to actively,
quickly and effectively manage responses to coronavirus
outbreaks, e.g. if there are further outbreaks or peaks in cases.
The DfE (Department for Education) view is that the s.37
temporary closure power needs to be retained to support the
SoSfE’s ability to actively and effectively manage our response to
COVID-19 outbreaks” (ibid. 26). Beyond educational
institutions the Coronavirus Act’s ascription, to government,
premises” has also achieved an aspect of longevity, when
expressed as follows: “Although DCMS (Department for Digital,
Culture Media and Sport) have not yet used these powers, there
is a strong agreement that they should remain as the situation is
still evolving and could be used by any government department
should it be needed” (ibid. 29). Indeed, the two years life span
of the Coronavirus Act 2020 provides indication of its juridical
longevity and enduring implications for organizations across all
sectors. Thus, it is imperative to recognize the long-term
organizational implications of the interim guidance measures
introduced as a consequence of the Coronavirus Act 2020. Of
particular significance are the existent and anticipated outcomes
of the rational choice modelling and techno-deterministic
remote working frameworks implicit within key aspects of the
COVID-19 secure working guidance pertaining to organizational
decision-making processes within the context of a public health
global pandemic.
Coronavirus Act 2020: Organizational decision-
making and the politics of COVID-19 secure
guidance
Central to the UK government’s early response to the
COVID-19 pandemic is the Coronavirus Act 2020 and
coterminous regulations under the Public health (Control of
Disease) Act 1984 [4]. Substantial aspects of the Coronavirus
Act 2020 are intended to alleviate the burden on frontline
National Health Service (NHS) primary and social care
provision. In addition to these measures “the Act significantly
enhanced the ability of public bodies across the UK to provide
an effective response to tackle this (COVID-19) pandemic”.
Beyond moderating the surge of demand on frontline NHS
services, the Act is intended to reduce pressure of delivering
non-critical tasks health workers perform; and in so doing
facilitating their ability to work remotely, less encumbered by
office workplace bureaucratic procedures. In accordance with
the government’s stated COVID-19 public health strategy
objective, “to delay and flatten the peak of the pandemic by
bringing forward the right measures at the right time”,
demarcations intended to “reduce unnecessary social contacts”
were instituted: “for the period required to mitigate the effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic” (ibid. 12). Consequently, the Act
enabled the governments of the UK to limit public access to
recreational spaces; prohibit mass gathering events and impose
restrictions on people inhabiting enclosed premises. On 23rd
March 2020, the UK government’s ad interim power to restrict
public gatherings spectacularly came into effect as the UK
became subject to its first COVID-19 national lockdown.
Whereby, public transport systems, educational establishments,
hospitality, non-necessary retail and office buildings were subject
to a public health precipitated lockdown. The impact of the
pandemic on the UK labor force was unparalleled in peace-time;
and the Act sort to mitigate the immediate predicament of an
ailing workforce stricken by sickness and an ailing workforce
enfeebled by the necessary curtailments imposed on in-person
work. With regards to the former, adjustments to Statutory sick
Pay (SSP) provision were retrospectively implemented from 13th
March 2020 and were designed primarily to ensure “that people
receive SSP from the first day that they are off work due to
coronavirus” and small businesses were awarded “refunding” so
as “to alleviate the significant financial burden on employers
through increased SSP costs”. Of specific relevance to the
purposes of the case study analysis, the Coronavirus Act 2020
instigated a series of government guidance for superintending
COVID-19 workplace biosecurity; several key guidance features
were directed at organizational decision-making. The following
case study discussion themes review, utilizes critical realist
perspective, in its evaluation of existing and anticipated aspects
of organizational political decision-making that have irreversibly
transformed as a consequence of the implementation of
COVID-19 secure working. Whereby, critical realism refers here
to a theoretical framework that recognizes structured inequalities
and agency as co-determinants of organizational decision-making
politics.
“COVID-19 secure” guidance: Risk assessment
political decision-making beyond rational choice
The Coronavirus Act 2020 guidance provision in terms of work
and organizations mainly pertains to the Coronavirus Job
Retention Scheme [5] and the stipulation: “everyone who can
work from home must do so”. It is one’s proposition, that the
latter condition of the Act’s guidance has profoundly
transformed organizational structures, dynamics and decision-
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the power to subject to closure “ cultural events, gatherings and
making. Prior to exploring these ramifications, it is necessary to
briefly outline: Working safely during Coronavirus (COVID-19)
[6]. Working safely during Coronavirus (COVID-19) published
in May 2020, provides guidance, applicable to England, on
COVID-19 biosecurity relevant to “people who work in or run
offices, contact centres and similar indoor environments” [7]. In
addition to the guidance’s priority actions of Test and Trace,
social distancing and contact surface sanitation, organizations
are instructed, in their COVID-19 biosecurity reasonable
adjustments, as thus: “Complete a COVID-19 risk assessment”.
It is one’s assertion that this guidance’s superintendence of
COVID-19 risk assessment impacts directly on organizational
decisions and makes apparent the limits of rational choice
modelling of decision-making processes. Indeed, the
specification of the COVID-19 risk assessment guidance refer
directly to organizational decision-making and the
impracticability of achieving perfect knowledge. For example,
consider the integration of politics into the following aspect of
the COVID-19 secure guidance specification:
“Risk assessment during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.
As an employer, you must protect people from harm. This
includes taking reasonable steps to protect your workers and
others from coronavirus. This is called a COVID-19 risk
assessment and it’ll help you manage risk and protect people.
You must:
• Identify what work activity or situations might cause
transmission of the virus
• Think about who could be at risk
• Decide how likely it is that someone could be exposed
• Act to remove the activity or situation, or if this isn’t possible
control the risk
If you have fewer than five employees, you don’t have to write
anything down, but it might help if you do. You should update
your COVID risk assessments to reflect any changes in
legislation or guidance that may impact how you carry out your
work activity, for example if there is a change in local or national
restrictions” [7].
Mainstream rational choice theory, postulates the existence of a
decision-making subject that can successfully achieve reasoned
judgement through the knowledgeable evaluation of germane
aspects of their environment. Rational choice presumption is in
evidence in the COVID-19 guidance on risk assessment
decision-making; as revealed through an application of a
“bounded rationality” [8] critique of the behavioral model of
rational choice. Thus, for example, Herbert A. Simon (ibid. 99)
critically observes that the presumed homo economicus of
rational choice models has access to “a well-organized and stable
system of preferences, and a skill in computation that enables
him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are
available to him, which of these will permit him to reach the
highest attainable point on his preference scale”. Thus, the
calculation of a maximum value outcome requires rational
knowledge pertaining to: “(1) the set of alternatives open to
choice, (2) the relationships that determine the pay-offs
(‘satisfactions’, ‘goal attainment’) as a function of the alternative
that is chosen, and (3) the preference-orderings among pay-offs”
(ibid. 100). Consider in this respect, the following COVID-19
risk assessment guidance: “If you have fewer than five employees,
you don’t have to write anything down, but it might help if you
do” [7]. One might suggest that within this latter statement
resides an attempt to reconcile inherent contradictions in
rational choice i.e., that the environment is both a given and
constraint to rational decision-making; furthermore, in the
absence of actual empirical evidence of a successful rational
choice maximization it would appear “the actual process is quite
different from the ones the rules describe”. It is therefore
plausible to anticipate “modifications that appear (on the basis
of casual empiricism) to correspond to observed behavior
processes in humans, and that lead to substantial computational
simplifications in the making of a choice”. Returning to the
extract from the COVID-19 risk assessment guidance and its
suggestion that assessors in certain circumstances can limit
recorded data inputs. The introduction of the simplification
exhibits a compelling similarity to the “dynamic adjustment over
a sequence of choices” that constitutes the actual decision-
making processes of human beings in a dynamic system (ibid.
112). Whereby the simplification infers recognition of
limitations posed by the external environment; i.e., “constraints
that define the problem of rationality for the organism”.
Furthermore, the environment boundary to rationality can
involve the intersection of cognition with “the skin of the
biological organism” (ibid. 101). Specifically, it is stated:
“Because of the psychological limits of the organism (particularly
with respect to computational and predictive ability), actual
human rationality-striving can at best be an extremely crude and
simplified approximation to the kind of global rationality that is
implied, for example, by game-theoretical models” (ibid.).
Elsewhere, Odih [9] has examined consumer culture, wearable
technologies and the body as a boundary limitation to the
calculability of financialized risk. For, present purposes the
application to the analysis of COVID-19 secure guidance of
Herbert A. Simon’s “examination of the schemes of
approximation that are actually employed by human and other
organisms” provides basis of further empirical evidence of the
limitations of rational choice theory. Indeed, an analysis of
organizational decision-making politics as bounded by “the skin
of the biological organism” is potentially an apposite theoretical
framing; but from a critical realist framework it falls short of
recognizing the co-determinant features of structure and agency.
For, the coronavirus disease COVID-19 is both an organic and
nonorganic visceral boundary limitation to a human being’s
capacity to achieve rational choice decision-making.
Direct parallels exist in respect to the rational prerequisites and
maximizing calculative decision-making of COVID-19
biosecurity organizational risk assessment and the
“administrative man” of rational choice management theory.
Whereby, both are predicated on the unquestioned existence of
“global rationality” Herbert A. Simon proposes an alternative
framework, which has been of some appeal to the analysis of
COVID-19 secure risk assessment and political decision-making.
Indeed, it is evident that the continued prevalence of micro-level
political decision-making analysis resonates with an approach to
rational choice that preferences “inquiring into the properties of
the choosing organism” rather than “inquiring into the
environment of choice”. In the 1955 publication of a Behavioral
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Model of Rational Choice, the micro-level analysis of choice is
the self-professed intention of Herbert A. Simon, whereby any
empirical existence of a computational decision-making
consciousness is disputed because logically the actual process
cannot be completely separated from the human unconscious
(ibid. 104). Nevertheless, the possibilities of a modified form of
rational choice are proffered in order to provide a
correspondence “to observed behavior processes in humans, and
that lead to substantial computational simplifications in the
making of a choice”. For, it is contended that the constraints on
rational choice are outcomes of an individual’s computational
capacity, which forms a boundary to “rational choice under
particular circumstances”. Conversely, in the above described
government guidance for COVID-19 secure, risk assessment the
rational choice model in operation appears oblivious of
boundaries to achieving maximum calculation in decision-
making. For, as has been detailed: “if we assume the global kinds
of rationality of the classical theory the problems of internal
structure of the firm or other organization largely disappear”
(ibid. 114). Given that in reality the internal dynamics of a
political persuasion never entirely dissipate the operating model
of decision-making can only achieve “approximate rationality”.
Thus, in the application of Herbert A. Simon’s framework to
the analysis of political decision-making and COVID-19 risk
assessment there is already some evidence to confirm the
supposition: “This organism’s simplifications of the real world
simplified model and the reality; and these discrepancies, in
turn, serve to explain many of the phenomena of organizational
behaviour” (ibid. 114). Contemporary application, of
“administrative man” as a critical framework in respect to the
COVID-19 pandemic and organizational decision-making, has
immense potential. However, research studies adopting this
theoretical framework are few and far between. Furthermore,
among those studies that have applied a concept of rationality as
bounded, management theorists have tended towards micro-
level analysis, in so doing have marginalized and or neglected
the relevance of structural analysis.
“COVID-19 secure” guidance: Remote working
technologically mediated politics of decision-making
Assessing the impact of COVID-19 secure measures on
organizational dynamics, an unintended outcome of social
distancing measures has been an irrevocable disruption in the
proximal materiality of the conditions of decision-making. For
example, consider the reconfiguring of decision-making
proximal materiality invoked by the following guidance
objective: “Ensuring workers maintain social distancing (2 m, or
1 m+ with risk mitigation where 2 m is not viable) wherever
possible, including while arriving at and departing from work
and while in work” [7]. One’s experience and or expectation of
office-based work prior to the COVID-19 social distancing
measures, framed the archetypical forum of organizational
decision-making within the context of an in-personal meeting in
material space and synchronous time. As a result of COVID-19
restrictions the rules of social distancing restricted in-person
close proximal organizational gatherings and in so doing
irrevocably disrupted the spatial and temporal context of the
progressivist transparent, decision-making forum and
undermined the situational machinations of political decision-
making. Social distancing is an antilogic in respect to the
proximal gathering and in-person dialogic principles of the
progressive organization. For, as per the progressivist discourse
of modern organizations proximity in time and space expresses a
coming together and visual transparency in decision-making.
The COVID-19 secure workplace guidance, conversely insisted
on socially distancing colleagues, into a blend of irreal/real
proximal spaces and (a) synchronic timeframes. Boardrooms,
conference and meeting rooms with their strategically placed
chairperson and scribes needed to be recomposed as per
guidance to “maintain social distancing in the workplace
wherever possible”. The progressive organizational ethos of
transparent, dialogic exchange also succumbed to
reconfiguration, as organizations seek to recreate open
discussion forums that account for the COVID-19 secure
guidance to acknowledge “those with protected characteristics as
social distancing may not be possible or will be more challenging
for workers with certain disabilities, such as individuals in
wheelchairs or with visual impairments” (bid.). Furthermore, the
sprawling parameters of social distancing mitigate against
preserving a delineation of space and time marked out for the
purposes of decision-making within an archetypical meeting
forum. For instance, the COVID-19 secure guidance states:
“Social distancing applies to all parts of a business or home, not
just the room where the service is delivered, but waiting rooms,
corridors and staircases, where applicable”.
Information Communication Technology (ICT) has been an
enabler of homeworking, providing socially and spatially
distanced employees with a remotely accessibly medium through
which to reconfigure organizational processes and decision-
making. In their modeling of Opinions and Lifestyle Survey
(OPN), the Office of National Statistics provides insights into
homeworking and technology. Firstly, the impact of the
Coronavirus pandemic first lockdown on homeworking was
colossal: “During the period 9 April to 20 April 2020, the OPN
found that 45% of adults in employment said they had worked
from home at some point in the last week” (ONS). Secondly, it
is evident that the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing
disparities in access to technology specifically designed for
remote working. Indeed, this is inferred in ONS comparative
and extrapolated analysis of the E-commerce Survey, specifically
it is stated that “less than half of all employees were provided
with a portable device for work, except in the information and
communication industry” (ONS). Extrapolating from the 2018
E-commerce Survey and 2019 Office of Communication study,
the ONS identify that when operationalized in terms of internet
speed, type of job and sector employed: “homeworking in
London appears more possible than in other regions”. The
general inference of the ONS’s report entitled, Technology
Intensity and Homeworking in the UK, is that: “The
coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has put an increased focus
on the manner in which people work”. Whereby the COVID-19
pandemic is anticipated to have accelerated a normalization of
the incorporation into our working lives, the use of digital
technologies to accomplish an increasing proportioning of
economically productive labor into remotely delivered,
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for the  purposes of choice introduce discrepancies between the
homeworking. And in so doing, rapidly advanced awareness of
latent problems associated with the computerized mediation of
organizational inter-personal relation and decision-making
processes.
Blanchard [10] provides an example of recent micro-level analysis
of cognitive dissonance and psychological stress problems arising
in the context of the migration from in-person to remote
computer mediated organizational decision-making. Psychology
and the increased prevalence of mental health issues feature in
other research such as Zhang et al.’s [11] study of the capacity of
Artificial Intelligence (AI) to conduct in-depth mining of ICT
systems to provide from employees, user-generated insights
relevant for the syndromic surveillance of their mental health.
Similarly, Herath and Herath [12] identify “lessons for
technology management and governance” of the mental health
consequences of employees’ coping with work intensification
imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the Zhang et al., and
Herath and Herath studies the focus on technologically
mediated decision-making focuses extensively on structural
features of the organization’s implementation and use of
information communication technology (ICT) [11,12]. Whereby,
the presumed solution to mental health issues arising from the
COVID-19 pandemic’s remote working intensification of ICT, is
to innovate in the development of smarter ICT. Such, an
approach is also evident in Wang and Wu’s [13] study entitled:
Knowledge Management Based on Information Technology in
response to COVID-19 crisis. For, it is proffered in this research
that, “the use of innovative IT-enabled mechanisms (e.g., non-
contact monitoring devices, intelligent robots, and telemedicine)
can reduce the risk of exposure and leverage an artificial
intelligence-based epidemic intelligence dashboard to support
appropriate decision-making” (ibid. 1). However, the focus solely
on macro-level decision-making analysis, neglects the impact of
the micro-level dimensions of politics in determining the
outcome of technologically mediated organizational decisions.
Conversely, Blanchard is concerned primarily with the
migration from face-to-face (FtF) into computer mediated video
conferencing. Blanchard focuses on how this dispersion impacts
on the reciprocity of perspective of groups involved in decision-
making processes. In psychology the conception of groups in
terms of reciprocity of perception is defined as entitativity i.e.,
“an individual’s cognitive assessment that a social unit is a
group” (ibid. 292). Entitativity is assumed to be elementary to
groups because individuals tend not to perform group processes
or actualize group outcomes without achieving cognitive
realization that the social entity is a group. Blanchard describes
how the migration of their laboratory working into COVID-19
secure video conferencing precipitated a recognition of a
changing dynamic in the entitativity of the group’s decision-
making. Examples, of the denaturing of the group’s entitativity
related to invisibility and a collective sense of “a lack of informal
interactions”; and these persisted despite the introduction of
supplements to video conferencing, such as modifications in the
group’s use of Google Drive and Google Docs so as to facilitate
synchronous interaction. With specific regards to decision-
making, Blanchard’s micro-level analysis realizes politics in terms
of individual attributes and hence focuses on the psychological
phenomenon of “surface acting”, which is facilitated by video
conferencing fatigue as a consequence of the cognitively
mediated emotion labored in the effort to sustain a convincing
level of entitativity. As Blanchard expresses it, “Surface acting
occurs when people behave in ways they feel artificial, which
causes cognitive dissonance and increases fatigue” (ibid. 293).
The cognitively mediated emotion work precipitated by video
conferencing involves the individual realizing that the computer
mediated group decision-making process is not as real as F2F
and thus participants perceive it necessary to “project” their
“own realness (i.e., similarity) to the others, and to foster
interactions that are stilted by the technology”.
Blanchard’s micro-level analysis therefore presupposes that video
conferencing “surface acting” denatures the online decision-
making event in terms of its intention to be outside of
organizational political projections. In this respect the intrusion
of political strategy can be ameliorated through an enhancement
of remote presence; and such propositions are evident in micro-
level analysis that has examined the technological augmentation
of embodied communication. Matthews et al. [14] explore the
emerging field of extended reality (XR)-based communication in
their article entitled: Crisis and Extended Realities: Remote
Presence in the Time of COVID-19. Similarly, to Blanchard the
phenomenon of video conferencing “fatigue” features in XR-
based communication research in terms of “the exhaustion
attenuated modes of social presence can inspire”. Examples of
XR include Mixed Reality (MR), Virtual Reality (VR) and
Augmented Reality (AR) with each variously defined in terms of
enabling “immersion, presence, interactivity” in their respective
enhanced computer mediated presence.
Within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic XR-based
communication represents a potential technological solution to
the remote presence impact on organizational sociality; as
Matthews expresses it: “XR has the potential to enhance a sense
of presence-of really being there together-in a range of vital
human domains” (ibid. 206). Limitations in respect to XR and
video conferencing fatigue are also recognized, whereby
Matthews cautions “of the damage this simulation might do,
while embracing their capacity to include and embrace the
diversity of human experience”. Circumspection can be
extended to the potentiality of XR-based communication to
exacerbate existing inequities of political decision-making as
inferred in the following statement: “Perhaps the most
important learning the affordances of these emerging
technologies provide is a timely reminder of the fragility of our
environment, of the world order and the individuals who rely
upon it”. Such dystopian imaginary, although profound, falls
short of critical reflection; for, its micro-analytical perspective
neglects structural conditions limiting the accessibility of
homeworking technology. Although digital infrastructures have
facilitated remote working during the COVID-19 pandemic, in
the absence of structural interventions to enable equitable
access, the crisis of public health exposes “a broad and wide
digital division”. Alternatively, the technological mediation of
organizational politics precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic
remote working conditions are more effectively theorized
through the integration of macro and micro-level analysis; for,
such multi-level theorizing enables an engagement with the
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inter-personal and structural impact of technologically mediated
inequality in decision-making processes.
“COVID-19 secure” remote working: Impact on
equality and diversity in organizational decision-
making
Office of National Statistics (ONS) reports on the prevalence of
homeworking in the immediate context of the UK’s first
lockdown, identify that in April 2020, 46.6% of people in
employment were engaged in some form of homeworking
(ONS). Within this cohort, it is estimated that 86.0% worked
from home as a consequence of the coronavirus (COVID-19)
pandemic. ONS calculation on productivity identify
homeworking as manifesting a one-third variation in time spent
working, specifically: 34.4% “worked fewer hours than usual”
and 30.3% “worked more hours than usual”. Insights into the
legacy impact on organizational decision-making of COVID-19
secure remote working are evident in gender and socio-economic
demographic differentials. For, it is estimated that “Women
were slightly more likely to do some work at home than men,
47.5% and 45.7% respectively” and “Occupations requiring
higher qualifications and more experience were more likely to
provide homeworking opportunities than elementary and
manual occupations”. The inference, presented here is that the
selection process involved in determining “Who should go to
work” has the potential to undermine equality and diversity
gains in circumventing the negative intrusion of politics into the
dynamics of organizational decision-making. Cognizant of this
potential dilemma the government introduced relevant
COVID-19 secure guidance.
According to the government’s guidance, organizational
decision-making on “Who should go to work” needs to involve
consultation between employers and workers; with the proviso
that: “this will need to be reflected in the COVID-19 workplace
risk assessment and actions taken to manage the risks of
transmission in line with this guidance” [7]. Factoring,
employees into the decision-making process can partially
mitigate against discriminatory politics; indeed, the Working
Safely During Coronavirus (COVID-19) guidance states:
“employers should be mindful of the particular needs of
different groups of workers or individuals”. In accordance with
the Equality Act 2010, the government guidance notifies
employers that in their decision-making on “Who should go to
work” an organization would be acting unlawfully “to
discriminate, directly or indirectly, against anyone because of a
protected characteristic such as age, sex or disability, race or
ethnicity”. To the latter protected categories have been added:
“particular responsibilities towards disabled workers and those
who are new or expectant mothers”. Whereby employers are
guided in their “Who should go to work” decision-making to
avoid negative political intrusion by appreciating the distinct
“circumstances of those with different protected characteristics”.
It is presumed that equality and diversity can be ensured
through “communicating appropriately with workers whose
protected characteristics might either expose them to a different
degree of risk” and or where employees might perceive the
COVID-19 biosecurity interventions as “inappropriate or
challenging for them”. In conjunction with communication
advice, the government’s “Equality in the workplace” COVID-19
guidance encourages the employer to make “reasonable
adjustments to avoid disabled workers being put at a
disadvantage, assessing the health and safety risks for new or
expectant mothers” and ensuring that these adjustments “do not
have an unjustifiable negative impact on some groups compared
to others, for example those with caring responsibilities or those
According to UK reports published, during 2020/21 the
COVID-19 pandemic is impacting differentially on women
compared with men. While more men perished from
COVID-19, women’s economic, employment and social well-
being “was more negatively affected than men’s during the first
year of the pandemic” (ONS). It has been statistically calculated
that during COVID-19 pandemic women in the UK spent
“significantly less time working from home and more time on
unpaid household work and childcare”. With specific regards to
the latter: “During September and early October 2020, women
spent 64% more time on unpaid household work than men”. As
might have already been discerned the increase in unpaid care
work mapped onto the COVID-19 guidance subject to closure
directions for schools and differentials between males and
females furloughed. For, example with regards to the former it
has been statistically calculated that: “a significantly greater
proportion of women (67%) than men (52%) homeschooled a
school-age child in late January and early February (13 January
and 7 February 2021)”. The impact on women’s well-being as a
result of bearing the responsibility for homeschooling is
documented as thus: “In April and early May 2020, around one
in three women (34%) reported that their well-being was
negatively affected by homeschooling a school age child
compared with only one in five men (20%). By late January and
early February 2021, it was taking a greater toll on both women
(53%) and men (45%)”. Consequently, it is unsurprising that:
“At the beginning of the UK’s first lockdown in March 2020,
women spent 55% more time than men on unpaid childcare.
However, this difference is smaller than in September and
October 2020, when women spent 99% more time on unpaid
Women are disproportionately represented in the customer-
facing service provision, hospitality and office-based service
sector jobs that were subject to closure direction during the
UK’s series of COVID-19 lockdowns. Consequently, women
experienced a higher incidence of entry into the Coronavirus
Job Retention Scheme i.e., furlough. According to the ONS
compared with 2.7 million men. By 31 October 2020, the
number of women on furlough reduced to 1.2 million compared
with 1.1 million men”. The attrition of women away from their
organizational offices and into the Coronavirus Job Retention
Scheme continued unabated throughout 2020. Indeed, among
the “total employments furloughed by gender, 1 July to 31
December 2020” it is evident that “since 1 July, more
employments have been furloughed with female job holders
than where the employee was male” [18]. Official statistical data
confirms that as the UK entered into a second wave of
Coronavirus virus epidemic levels of infection “for employments
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with religious commitments” (7,15,16).
childcare than men” [17].
[17],  “On  1  July  2020,  there  were  2.9  million  on  furlough,
where the employee was female there were 1.19 million
employments furloughed at 31 October (year 2020; and
compared with 1.14 million male employees)”. Limits placed on
service industry business and social gatherings in the autumn of
2020 further sustained the sectorial imbalance of COVID-19
secure closures, thus escalating the gender differential impact on
females, whereby, “for employments where the employee was
November (year 2020; and compared with 1.79 million male
employees)” and “figures show that this number decreased
throughout December to 1.88 million at 31 December (year
2020; and compared with 1.85 million male employees)”.
In March 2021, one year after the Coronavirus Act 2020
achieved Royal Assent, an equality impact assessment was
published as part of regular continuous reviews and
parliamentary scrutiny [18,19]. The UK Government is at pains
to express appreciation of the profound “impact many of the
provisions of the Act have on people’s lives” (ibid. 17).
Organizational and business equality human rights impacts are
also factored into this cognizance. For, as the Government
details: “On 28 July, an Impact Assessment of the provisions of
the Act was published, recording the equality analysis undertake
to enable Ministers to fulfil the requirements placed on them by
the public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) as set out in section 149
of the Equality Act 2010”. It is acknowledged by the
Government that the latter review identified that aspects of the
Act’s provision have had disproportionate impact. But these
equality and human rights differential outcomes were
considered to be outweighed by the betterment precipitative of
the Government’s strategy [19]. Specifically, the Government
concedes: “it was found that, in some cases, the provisions could
give rise to more significant impacts on certain protected groups.
However, these impacts were considered to be justified and a
proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of
protecting the general public from Coronavirus by increasing
the capacity of public service systems and mitigating the spread
of infection” (ibid. 17-18).
The UK government’s willingness to concede to a degree of
equality and human rights differential impacts as collateral
damage, when set against a highly effective vaccine rollout, is a
disconcerting ethical dilemma. Conversely, it is proposed that
positive discrimination direct intervention is necessary so as to
guarantee that government strives beyond merely securing base-
line equality and human rights [10,12,20,21-23]. One such
example is espoused by Viswanath and Mullins [24] in their
article entitled: Gender Responsive Budgeting and the
COVID-19 Pandemic Response: a Feminist Standpoint. The
authors provide a feminist standpoint review of the differential
impact on females of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United
States. Whereby, the disproportionately female sectorial
composition of the labour markets worse affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic e.g., hospitality, retail and services in
conjunction with these being the lowest paid jobs has resulted in
substantial gender differences in the pandemic’s economic
downturn. Viswanath and Mullins [24] propose that these
gender differentials provide sufficient evidence to support the
formal inclusion of “gender responsive budgeting” into
COVID-19 policy decision-making processes. Specifically, the
authors state “The policy tool of gender responsive budgeting,
successfully implemented in various countries, is proposed to
offset the gender inequities triggered by the pandemic in the
U.S.” (ibid.1). The feminist economic tool of “gender inclusive
policy-making” exceeds beyond a first wave feminist notion of
visibly increasing the inclusion of under-represented groups in
decision-making, while retaining existing institutional structures
and processes. Conversely, Viswanath and Mullins [24] recognize
that gender inequalities are reproduced in the politics of
decision-making; and thus efficacious “gender inclusive policy-
making” necessitates examining “public problems through a
gender lens” (ibid. 11). One concurs with this proposition,
especially when it is recognized that females are
disproportionately responsible for care activities and the
COVID-19 crisis of public health, differentially impacted on
informal care providers. Thus, it is reasonable to insist that
governments exceed beyond securing base-line equality and
human rights in their policy decision-making; and instead,
directly intervene in addressing gender disadvantage precipitated
by the COVID-19 pandemic [25]. Gender Responsive Budgeting
(GRB) is a positive intervention; and there needs to be wider
solidarity with the following proposition: “Mainstreaming GRB
into pandemic response would pressure governments to ‘put
their money where their mouth is’ and pave the way to restore
women’s labor force participation rates”.
“COVID-19 secure” compliance: Legacy impact on
organizational politics of decision-making conflict
Despite convincing disputations, academic discourse on
organizational decision-making is substantively preoccupied with
conceptualizing this phenomenon as Darr and Johns [22]
express it: “as an individual-level construct”. Consequently,
structural influences such as regulatory routinization are
deprioritized in favor of the micro-level analysis of “individual
attributes such as Machiavellian or self-monitoring in relation to
perceived politics” (ibid. 170). Considered from a “single-level
vacuum” the COVID-19 secure work conditions legalized by the
Coronavirus Act 2020, should irrevocably disrupt the politics of
self-monitoring and Machiavellian machinations of the
individual-level agents that constitute the main focus of micro-
level analysis [26,27]. Thus, from this micro-level perspective a
legacy impact of the COVID-19 secure workplace, is a limiting
off, in-person opportunities for the Machiavellian pursuit of self-
interest. In this respect, disparities in the employee profile of
COVID-19 secure working compliance can be reduced, in micro-
level analysis, to an analysis of the biographic profile and
personality attributes of individual organizational actors. Such
appears to be the basis of the Office of National Statistics [28]
report entitled: Coronavirus and Compliance with Government
Guidance, UK: April 2021 [14,29]. Carried out by the
independent market research agency IFF, the report is based on
the findings of a mixed-methods qualitative study involving, 180
in-depth qualitative interviews with UK adults (18 years and
over), conducted between 23 December 2020 and 22 January
2021; and these interviews were concurrent with the
administration of diaries into which 90 of the participants
entered information.
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Particularly, interesting are the study’s findings pertaining to
COVID-19 secure compliance among low-income workers versus
that of high-income [9]. With regards to the former, it is
reported that: “For many low-income workers, employers played
a critical role in their opportunities to comply”. Whereby in
customers facing and in-person work activities government
COVID-19 secure guidance, set into law by the Coronavirus Act
2020, and directly translated by employers, provided for an
unavoidable situational compliance as a necessitate of fulfilling
the employment role. Non-compliance with the COVID-19
secure guidance among this cohort of workers is defined by the
study as a micro-level feature of situational decision-making. For
example, rational decision-making is presumed in the micro-level
analysis approach when low-income workers reported that their
compliance with guidelines was predicated on their employers
providing the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) necessary to
facilitate COVID-19 secure in-person work. Conversely,
irrational politicized decision-making is discerned to occur when
low-income workers exhibited non-compliance in avoiding the
COVID-19 secure surveillance technology of Test and Trace, as
is evident in the following research finding: “A few reported that
they were under income pressure and that they or their
colleagues would not necessarily self-isolate, be tested or
participate in Test and Trace because they could not afford to be
off work without pay”. The inference here is that the study’s
inclusion of “a few” as an operative places emphasis on the
decision-making to be a situational tactic peculiarly adopted by a
limited number of organizational actors as opposed to a
universal decision-making response to e.g., economic and
politicised structural inadequacies in SSP [30,31]. It is apparent
here and elsewhere that the study’s limited micro-analysis of
COVID-19 guidance decision-making, marginalizes a focus on
macro-structural features such as PPE supply-chain resourcing.
Indeed, the limitations of micro-level framing are compounded
in the study’s analysis of compliance among high-income
workers.
Significantly the COVID-19 secure conditions of working
accelerated latent anachronisms in office-based organizational
delivery within the international space and instantaneous time
of the post-industrial informational knowledge economy
[17,28,32,33].  Accordingly,  the  study  reports:  “Many  high-
income workers were working from home”. Correspondingly, it
is reported that the prevalence of homeworking for high-income
workers correlated with a high-level of reported COVID-19
secure compliance practice by this cohort. Significantly,
compliance and noncompliance among this high-income
cohort, are micro-analyzed by the study as outcomes of an
individual’s situational decision-making; as is inferred in the
following reported finding: “Many high-income workers had
good opportunities to follow the guidance [8,34]. There were,
however, some high-income workers who broke social mixing
and social distancing guidance to meet family and friends. Many
of these participants justified this on the ground that either they
or a member of their family required support with childcare. Or
to maintain their mental well-being”. As can be discerned, the
micro-level analysis marginalizes and or ameliorates structural
factors through the assumption that high-income workers have
“high levels of understanding of the guidance informed by
mainstream sources of information, with good awareness of the
underlying rationale” and this in conjunction with the existence
of homeworking space resources provides for the conditions of
compounds the limitations of micro-analysis of organizational
politics and decision-making; for it neglects to interpret non-
compliance in low-income and high-income groups as a
manifestation of conflict in the organizational politics of
COVID-19 secure compliance.
CONCLUSION
Conversely, an appreciation of decision-making frameworks that
combine micro and macro analysis introduces into the
conceptualisation of COVID-19 guidance compliance what is
described elsewhere and in previous times by Darr and Johns
on political activity or perceptions”. While non-compliance
might be interpreted as dissension, without also exploring the
structural determinants of conflict processes non-compliance is
merely reduced to the personality attributes and or the
situational politicized decision-making of the individual.
Alternatively, a focus on agency and structure in the conflict
processes that come into being in decision-making, facilitates an
awareness of COVID-19 secure guidance in terms of the
management of an organizational politics of compliance. In so
doing, providing scope for the analysis of incidents of
noncompliance, as manifestations of the impact of conflict in
the structured inequalities of the politics of organizational
decision-making. This case study has focused on conflictual
features of rational choice theory and technological determinism
in respect to the Coronavirus Act 2020’s COVID-19 secure
guidance and with regards to ensuring equality and diversity in
its organizational decision-making processes.
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